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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060676-CA

v.
ANTHONY GALLEGOS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to one count
of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and one count of attempted possession of a
controlled substance in jail or prison, a class A misdemeanor. R. 29-30. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Should this Court overturn the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, where defendant has not presented any evidence showing that
his plea was unknowing and involuntary?
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and its findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,111, 983 P.2d 556.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004) and rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, are included in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual predicate
On March 2, 2006, officers received reports of a stabbing at a local bar. R. 56: 5.
When officers arrived, the victim and several witnesses identified defendant as the
attacker. R. 56: 5-6. After defendant was arrested and transported to jail, officers found
methamphetamine on him. R. 56: 6. Defendant was subsequently charged with one
count of aggravated assault, one count of using a dangerous weapon in a fight, and two
counts of possessing a controlled substance in jail or prison. R. 4-5.
After repeatedly telling the trial court that he was not impaired,
defendant pleads guilty
On March 30, 2006, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault
and one count of attempted possession of a controlled substance in jail or prison. R. 2930. Defendant signed a written statement in support of his guilty plea. R. 22-27. In that
statement, defendant stated that he "was not under the influence of any drugs, medication,
or intoxicants which would impair [his] judgment when [he] decided to plead guilty." R.
26. Defendant also testified that he was "not presently under the influence of any drug,
medications, or intoxicants which impair[ed his] judgment" at the time he signed that
statement. R. 26.
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When the parties presented the written plea agreement to the court, defendant
initially expressed confusion about its terms. R. 56: 3. As a result, the court allowed
defendant to leave the courtroom and confer with his attorney. R. 56: 3. Defendant was
absent from the courtroom for approximately 45 minutes. R. 29. After returning to the
courtroom, defendant informed the court that he understood the agreement and still
wanted to plead guilty. R. 56: 4. The court asked defendant whether he felt "pressured in
any way to plead guilty today." R. 56: 4. Defendant responded that he was not being
pressured to plead guilty or "do something [he did not] want to do." R. 56: 4.
The court then asked defendant whether he was "under the influence of any
medication or drugs or alcohol." R. 56: 4. Defendant informed the court that he was
taking Thorazine. R. 56: 5. The court asked defendant what Thorazine was and whether
it "in any way cloud[ed his] judgment." R. 56: 5. Although defendant did not explain
what Thorazine was, he did explain that Thorazine had not "in any way cloud[ed his]
judgment." R. 56: 5. The court followed up by asking defendant whether his "mind
[was] clear today" and whether he "understood what he was doing." R. 56: 5. Defendant
stated that his mind was clear and that he understood what he was doing. R. 56: 5. The
court accordingly accepted defendant's guilty plea and found that the plea was "knowing
and voluntary." R. 56: 7.
Defendant asks to withdraw his guilty plea
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel asked for a continuance so that he
could file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. R. 35, 57: 2. When the court asked what
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the basis for the motion would be, defendant's counsel explained that defendant felt that
he was not guilty of the charges. R. 57: 2.
On May 24, 2006, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 37.
The stated basis for the motion was that "[t]he defendant feels that he is not guilty." R.
37. The motion did not allege that defendant was under the influence of any medication
during the plea hearing. R. 37.
The court heard arguments on defendant's motion on June 1, 2006. R. 40.
Defendant's counsel explained that defendant had asked him "to file a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty," and that defendant was "under the false impression that he
had - that he can withdraw the plea as a matter of right." R. 58: 3. In response, the
prosecutor argued that a post-plea claim of innocence is not a proper basis for
withdrawing a guilty plea. R. 58: 4. Defendant's counsel offered no substantive reply to
that argument, but added that defendant had "just whispered to me today that he feels like
he was under the influence of Thorazine as well." R. 58: 5. Neither defendant nor his
counsel offered any further argument or proof regarding this claim. The court
nevertheless continued the hearing so that it could review the tape of the plea hearing. R.
58:5.
The court held another hearing on defendant's motion on June 8, 2006. In his
opening argument, defendant's counsel repeated defendant's claim that "he is not guilty."
R. 59: 2. Defendant then personally addressed the court and asserted that he had not
understood the court's questions at the plea hearing: "I didn't really quite understand it
because under the drugs that I was on, I would agree probably to anything at that time.
4

But since I've stopped those, I've got a clear head, I can think straight, and do the right
thing." R. 59: 2. Defendant did not elaborate any further, nor did he offer any actual
proof that he had been impaired at the plea hearing.
The court denied defendant's motion. The court noted that defendant had had the
opportunity to confer with counsel throughout the plea hearing, that it had engaged in a
thorough rule 11 plea colloquy with defendant, and that defendant had given "satisfactory
answer[s]" to the court's questions. R. 59: 4. The court accordingly found that
defendant's "plea was knowing and voluntary," and that defendant was "not under the
influence of drugs or medication or anything else" when he entered his plea. R. 59: 4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, defendant claims that the court failed to satisfy its
investigatory obligations regarding his alleged Thorazine use.
Although defendant challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, he does not cite to, let alone satisfy, the statutory standard that governs such
motions. Instead, defendant focuses on the separate question of whether the trial court
properly complied with its investigatory obligations under rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Utah Code does not permit withdrawal of a guilty plea based on
a rule 11 violation, however, but instead states that a defendant may "only" withdraw a
guilty plea if he shows that the plea was unknowing and involuntary. Defendant has not
made that showing in this case.
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Even if rule 11 were at issue, defendant's claim would still fail. Though the
supreme court in Beckstead did hold that a trial court has certain investigatory obligations
when a defendant claims that he was impaired at a plea hearing, the supreme court also
held that a trial court satisfies those obligations by having a "meaningful engagement"
with the defendant during the plea proceedings. The record in this case conclusively
shows that the trial court had a meaningful engagement with defendant below.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA
Defendant claims that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
because the trial court failed to investigate his use of Thorazine, as allegedly required by
rule 11. Aplt. Br. 9-19. Defendant cites to the wrong standard for withdrawing a guilty
plea, however, and he also fails to offer any evidence supporting his claim of
impairment. Defendant's claim should accordingly be rejected.
A.

Defendant's claim fails because he has produced no evidence
that his plea was unknowing and involuntary.

There is only one way to directly challenge a guilty plea in Utah. Under Utah
Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004), a defendant must file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea prior to sentencing, and the plea can then "be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
Defendant has not met this burden. When he filed his motion below, defendant
requested permission to withdraw his plea so that he could substantively contest the

6

charges. R. 37; 57: 2; 58: 3. Although defendant subsequently claimed that he was also
impaired during the plea colloquy, he did not ever amend his motion to argue that his
plea had been unknowing and involuntary, nor did he ever claim impairment in any filing
with the court.
More importantly, the record contains no evidence that defendant's alleged use of
Thorazine rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. In defendant's written
statement in support of his plea, he testified that he was "not under the influence of any
drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair [his] judgment." R. 26. Although
defendant later mentioned his use of Thorazine during the plea colloquy, he still
repeatedly insisted that his use of Thorazine had not impaired his judgment. R. 56: 4-5.
The court accepted defendant's explanation, and then completed what defendant
describes as "a complete Rule 11 colloquy." Aplt. Br. 8.
In his unsworn statements during the arguments on his motion to withdraw,
defendant subsequently backtracked and claimed that he had been impaired he entered
his plea. R. 58: 5; 59: 2. Defendant did not ever provide the court with any evidence
that he was actually on Thorazine at the time of the plea, however, let alone provide
proof that his use of Thorazine had rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. Thus,
the only evidence that is actually in the record regarding defendant's alleged use of
Thorazine is his signed statement during the initial plea proceedings attesting that he was
"not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair
[his] judgment." R. 26. Defendant has therefore failed to show that his plea was
unknowing and involuntary.
7

Defendant does not even cite to the knowing and voluntary standard in his brief,
let alone attempt to show that he has satisfied it. Instead, defendant argues that the trial
court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea as a consequence of its failure to
investigate his use of Thorazine. Aplt. Br. 9-19. In support of this claim, defendant
relies on State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, 140 P.3d 1288, which held that such an
investigation is required by rule 11. Aplt. Br. 9-19. Rule 11 does not provide a proper
basis for relief, however, so Beckstead is inapposite to this case.
As indicated above, Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 states that a guilty plea can
"be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made." This statute does not mention rule 11, let alone suggest that rule 11
provides a basis for withdrawing a guilty plea. Instead, section 77-13-6 states that a
guilty plea can "only" be withdrawn if the plea was unknowingly and involuntarily
entered. When interpreting a statute, courts "assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80,
Tf 8, 52 P.3d 1276. The term "only" is a restrictive term, being defined as "exclusively"
or "solely." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1577 (unabridged 1993 ed.).
Thus, under the plain language of section 77-13-6, a defendant's exclusive and sole
option for withdrawing a guilty plea is to show that the plea was unknowing and
involuntary. By statute, there is no other basis for withdrawing a guilty plea.
Though Beckstead and the other cases cited by defendant admittedly held that a
rule 11 violation could support a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, those cases are readily
distinguishable because they relied on a previous version of section 77-13-6.
8

Before 2003, section 77-13-6 allowed a defendant to withdraw his plea on "good
cause shown." See generally Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, Historical and Statutory Notes.
Utah courts historically interpreted this good cause provision to include technical rule 11
violations. See State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) ("A trial court's
failure to comply strictly with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in
accepting a guilty plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that
plea."); accord State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Jennings,
875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994).
In addition to this statutory standard, defendants have also been allowed to
challenge a guilty plea by claiming that the plea was taken in violation of their
constitutional rights. Under the constitutional standard, a plea is deemed invalid if it was
not "knowing and voluntary." See, e.g., Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah
1993); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, f 21 n.9, 81 P.3d 775 (quotations and
citations omitted); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Utah 1993).
Utah courts have repeatedly concluded that the constitutional standard does not
require strict rule 11 compliance. See, e.g., Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a
failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea
unknowing and involuntary). Though rule 11 's "procedural rules" "often overlap" with
the constitutional standard, the two standards are not co-extensive. Stilling, 856 P.2d at
671. Instead, the constitutional standard requires a "more limited" inquiry than that
which is set forth in rule 11, Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992, and the standard is satisfied if the
trial court ensures that the defendant was "fully aware of the direct consequences of [his]
9

guilty plea." Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, f 21 n. 9 (quotations and citations omitted);
accord Gonzales, 2005 UT App 538, \ 8, 127 P.3d 1252.
The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Bluemel v. State illustrates this
distinction. Like defendant in this case, Bluemel claimed that her plea should have been
invalidated because she was taking medications at the time of her plea. Bluemel v. State,
2007 UT 90,16, 173 P.3d 842. On appeal, this Court held that Bluemel's plea was
unknowing and involuntary because the trial court failed to properly comply with rule 11.
Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, \ 16, 134 P.3d 181. The supreme court reversed,
holding that "[i]n order to show that her claim has merit, Bluemel was obligated at the
post-conviction hearing to establish not just that the trial court violated rule 11, but that
she did not, in fact, enter her pleas in a knowing and voluntary way." Bluemel, 2007 UT
90,U19.
Thus, a defendant does not satisfy his burden under the constitutional knowing and
voluntary standard by simply showing that rule 11 was violated. Instead, a defendant
must present evidence that specifically shows that the plea was actually unknowing and
involuntary.
In 2003, the Utah State Legislature amended section 77-13-6 and replaced the
prior statute's good cause standard with the constitutional knowing and voluntary
standard. Not only did the amendment expressly adopt the constitutional standard's exact
language, but the amendment's two legislative sponsors both specifically expressed the
intent to adopt the constitutional standard as the new statutory standard. When
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Representative Katherine Bryson, the bill's primary sponsor, introduced the bill to the
Utah House of Representatives, she explained its purpose as follows:
The current statute permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon good
cause shown.... What the constitution requires is that the plea be made
knowingly and voluntarily, and rule 11 should actually create a safe harbor
and not be the standard by which withdrawal is determined. [H.B.] 238
would correct some problems by permitting defendants to withdraw their
pleas only on a showing that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. It's a
constitutional standard and the standard on post-conviction challenges.
Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238, 2003 Utah Legislature,
February 28, 2003, audio file located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House:::=H.
After Representative Bryson finished introducing the bill, she asked for questions or
comments by other representatives. There were no questions or comments, and the bill
passed the House by a 63-0 vote. Id.
When Senator David Gladwell later introduced the bill to the Utah Senate, he
explained that although rule 11 requires a judge to "recite all of the rights that a defendant
would give up if the defendant were to plead guilty,... the only thing the constitution
requires is that a plea be made knowingly and voluntarily. Hence, the statute itself will
be changed to simply show that the court may allow a defendant to withdraw his or her
plea upon a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Senator David
Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B. 238, 2003 Utah Legislature, March 4, 2003, audio file
located at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=S. There were no questions or
further comments regarding the bill, and the bill passed the Senate by a 27-0 vote. Id,
Thus, although prior cases suggested that there was a link between section 77-13-6
and rule 11, those cases were statutorily abrogated by the 2003 amendments to section
11

77-13-6. Those amendments expressly incorporated the knowing and voluntary standard
from the constitutional analysis, and that standard is not reliant on rule 11.
This is not to say that rule 11 has no place in the knowing and voluntary analysis.
When introducing the 2003 amendments to the House, Representative Bryson explained
that "rule 11 should actually create a safe harbor" in subsequent motion to withdraw
cases. Representative Katherine Bryson, Floor Debate on H.B. 238, 2003 Utah
Legislature, February 28, 2003, audio file located at
http://le,utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House=H. Senator Gladwell echoed this language
in his own comments, stating that "rule 11 is still in force. Judges will still use rule 11 to
identify those rights given up by a defendant and it will continue to be a safe harbor if...
all of those rights are accurately recited." Senator David Gladwell, Floor Debate on H.B.
238, 2003 Utah Legislature, March 4, 2003, audio file located at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp ?House=::S.
It is therefore significant that both sponsors referred to rule 1 l's prospective role
as a "safe harbor" provision. A safe harbor provision "affords protection from liability or
penalty." Black's Law Dictionary, Safe Harbor (8th ed. 2004). As explained below, the
2003 amendments were expressly intended to prevent defendants from withdrawing a
guilty plea based on nothing more than a rule 11 violation. Thus, the clear implication
was that rule 11 would continue to act as a safe harbor for the plea itself, thereby further
insulating the plea from attack if it could be shown that rule 11 had been followed. While
a rule 11 violation alone therefore no longer acts as grounds for withdrawing a guilty
plea, a trial court's compliance with rule 11 still acts as protection against subsequent
12

claims that the plea was unknowing and involuntary. This comports with the supreme
court's long-standing rule that strict rule 11 compliance creates a presumption that the
plea was knowing and voluntary. See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203;
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 11, 1 P.3d 1108.
Returning to the case at hand, defendant's claim is predicated on the supreme
court's decision in Beckstead. Aplt. Br. 9-19. Although Beckstead was issued in 2006,
the plea at issue was entered under the pre-2003 version of section 77-13-6. State v.
Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, \ 2, 100 P.3d 267. More importantly, the supreme court's
analysis in Beckstead was expressly predicated on the pre-2003 rule allowing withdrawal
of a guilty plea based on a rule 11 violation. See Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ^ 10-21.
Defendant's claim is therefore reliant on a standard that is no longer in effect, and his
arguments are inapplicable to this case.
In sum, regardless of whether the trial court did or did not comply with its rule 11
obligations under Beckstead, defendant was still statutorily required to specifically show
that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. Defendant has not only failed to invoke
the standard, but he has also failed to point to any evidence that would have satisfied it if
he had. This Court should therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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B.

Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court did conduct a
meaningful inquiry into defendant's use of Thorazine.

As discussed above, rule 11 no longer provides a separate basis for withdrawing a
guilty plea, and the decision in State v. Beckstead is therefore inapplicable to this case.
Even if it was, however, Beckstead does not help defendant.
In Beckstead, the supreme court considered "the scope of a sentencing court's
duty" under rule 11 "to explore the effects of alcohol consumption on a defendant's
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea." 2006 UT 42, ^f 6. Like defendant
in this case, Beckstead argued that trial courts have specific investigatory obligations
when a defendant later claims to have been intoxicated at the time of the plea. Id. The
supreme court rejected that argument: "We decline to judicially amend rule 11 to
mandate additional minimum inquiries that a sentencing court must pursue when alerted
that a defendant may be unable to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Such
additions would increase the range of matters with which a sentencing judge would be
required to strictly comply. This would be unwise." Id. at f 15.
Rather than requiring a "mandated script" in such cases, the supreme court held
that a trial court satisfies its rule 11 obligation if it has a "meaningful engagement" with
the defendant prior to accepting the guilty plea, or even after defendant raises the issue of
impairment. Id. at Tfl[ 16, 18. The trial court satisfied this requirement in Beckstead, for
example, by engaging in a "thorough rule 11 colloquy" with Beckstead, "interacting]
repeatedly" with him during the plea hearing, "continuing] to interact with Mr.
Beckstead when the issue of his sobriety was raised," and "reviewing] a tape of the
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hearing" after Beckstead's competency was raised in the post-plea motion to withdraw.
Id. atf 21.
In Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, 147 P.3d 410, the supreme court applied
Beckstead's "meaningful engagement" rule to a defendant's claim that he was under the
influence of drugs at the time of his plea. Id. atfflf1-2.1 Like defendant in this case,
Oliver claimed that the medications he had been taking at the time of his plea had "made
him incapable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea," and he also claimed that the
trial court had failed to adequately assess his competency. Id. The supreme court
rejected both claims. Although the court "agree[d] . . . that when the defendant confirms
that he has recently taken a drug, the court must inquire further into the defendant's
capacity," the court "refuse[d] to mandate specific procedures" for this inquiry. Id. at ^f
10. Again rejecting the call for a "prescribed script" in such cases, the supreme court
reaffirmed that a trial court satisfies its rule 11 obligations as long as it "pursue[s] a
meaningful engagement with a defendant during the plea colloquy." Id. at ^f 8.
In this case, defendant claims that the trial court should have "inquire [d] into"
"how the drug affected" him, "the level of dosage" that he had taken, and "how recently
the medication was taken." Aplt. Br. 10, 12. Defendant also claims that the court erred
by failing to conduct a general investigation into "the effects of Thorazine on an
individual's ability to understand and comprehend important decisions such as the entry
of a plea." Aplt. Br. 10, 13.

1

As with Beckstead, the plea in Oliver pre-dated the 2003 amendments to Utah
Code Annotated § 77-13-6. See Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, % 3, 147 P.3d 410.
15

While these specific inquiries may have been helpful, the court was not obligated
to follow any sort of "prescribed script" to satisfy rule 11. Oliver, 2006 UT 60, \ 8;
Beckstead, 2006 UT 42,fflf16, 18. Instead, the trial court was only required to have a
"meaningful engagement" with defendant. Oliver, 2006 UT 60, f 8; Beckstead, 2006 UT
42, Tfl[ 16, 18. The court clearly satisfied that obligation in this case. Prior to accepting
defendant's plea, the court received a signed statement in which defendant specifically
declared that he "was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair [his] judgment when [he] decided to plead guilty." R, 26. After
accepting that statement, the court went through what even defendant describes as "a
complete Rule 11 colloquy." Aplt. Br. 8. During this colloquy, the court asked
defendant whether he was "under the influence of any medication or drugs or alcohol."
R. 56: 4. After defendant informed the court that he was taking Thorazine, the court
asked defendant what Thorazine was and whether it "in any way cloud[ed his]
judgment." R. 56: 5. Defendant answered by agreeing that Thorazine did not "in any
way cloud [his] judgment." R. 56: 5. The court then asked defendant whether his "mind
[was] clear today" and whether he "understood what he was doing." R. 56: 5. Defendant
agreed that his mind was clear and that he understood what he was doing. R. 56: 5.
In addition to this pre-plea meaningful engagement, the court also had a
meaningful engagement with defendant after he filed his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Specifically, after defendant raised the possibility of impairment, the court agreed
to examine the tape of the plea hearing to ascertain the quality of defendant's answers. R.
58:5. After reviewing the tape, the court heard additional arguments on the issue from
16

defendant prior to ruling on defendant's motion. R. 59: 2. This satisfied the court's
obligations under Beckstead and Oliver.
Defendant also claims that the trial court's findings were not specific enough to
support its denial of his motion. Aplt. Br. 10. Defendant is incorrect. In its ruling, the
court noted that it had discussed the issue with defendant during the rule 11 colloquy, that
defendant had specifically addressed the issue in his written statement, that defendant had
had the opportunity to confer with counsel throughout the plea hearing, and that
defendant had given "satisfactory answer[s]" to the court's questions during the plea
colloquy. R. 59: 4. Based on this review, the court found that defendant's "plea was
knowing and voluntary" and that defendant was "not under the influence of drugs or
medication or anything else" when he entered his plea. R. 59: 4.
Although the court admittedly failed to enter findings about defendant's "speech
patterns [or] demeanor," Aplt. Br. 18, it was not obligated to do so by Utah Code
Annotated § 77-13-6, rule 11, Beckstead, Oliver, or any other authority cited by
defendant. While rule 11 requires the court to make an "informed decision," Oliver,
2006 UT 60, ^[ 10, that "determination does not mandate a particular script or rote
recitation," and it "should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual."
Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, Tf 11 (quotations and citations omitted). The court's findings in
this case were informed by defendant's written and oral responses to very specific
questions, as well as by its review of the videotape of the proceedings. This clearly
satisfied rule 11.
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Finally, defendant claims that his statements in support of the plea should have
been discounted due to his impairment. Aplt. Br. 11. According to defendant, the trial
court "should have been well aware that individuals who are under the influence of drugs
normally [do] not acknowledge the effects that those drugs may have on their ability to
reason and think clearly." Aplt. Br. 11. Defendant has never conclusively demonstrated
that he was actually on Thorazine at the time of the hearing, however, so this claim is
purely speculative as applied to this case.
In any event, this claim runs contrary to the very purposes behind the use of
psychotropic drugs such as Thorazine. As noted in Oliver, "[w]hile the presence of
alcohol in a defendant's system can only decrease his ability to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea, that is not necessarily the case with prescription medication. In most
instances,. .. when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant by a physician, it is to
improve the defendant's cognitive abilities." Oliver, 2006 UT 60, f 14. Barring some
evidence to the contrary, "the fact that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation
and is receiving medication to treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing
in favor of a finding that the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary
plea." Id.2

Though there is no evidence in this case regarding Thorazine, other courts have
commonly recognized that, like the medications at issue in Oliver, Thorazine is a
psychotropic drug that is used to treat various forms of psychosis. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Portuondo, 459 F.Supp.2d 267, 273 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Thorazine, known also as
chlorpromazine, typically is used to treat psychotic disorders and symptoms such as
hallucinations, delusions, and hostility."); Hightower by Dahler v. Olmstead, 959
F.Supp. 1549, 1552 (N.D.Ga. 1996) (stating that Thorazine is "used to treat
18

In any event, Defendant has not produced any evidence in this case, let alone
evidence that his alleged use of Thorazine was actually harmful in this particular case.
Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted February \S , 2008.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

/t*A

RYAND.TENNEY
Assistant Attorney General

schizophrenia and other serious psychotic disorders" by "reducing] the symptoms of
hallucinations, delusions, paranoid ideation, and disturbed mental thought in patients").
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-13-6

This document has been updated.

Use KEYCITE.

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 13. PLEAS
-•§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence
not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance,
motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 3 0 days of pleading guilty
no contest.

held
may
a
or

(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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This document has been updated. Use KEYCITE.
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
-f RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally
ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses
to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to
make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and
does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine
in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime
was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability,
that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has
been reached;
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(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the
statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any
collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the
time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will
be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the
judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall
be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule,
the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply
with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2007
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West
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